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NOTE
ECONOMICALLY NECESSITATED FACULTY DISMISSALS AS
A LIMITATION ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM
INTRODUCTION

Academic freedom enables members of the academic community to research, investigate, and teach without having unnecessary restrictions or officious supervision placed on their activities.' The value of this freedom has long been recognized by courts
that realize that if teachers do not have this freedom, the effectiveness of the schools in which they teach is appreciably diminished Academic freedom, therefore, requires protecting teachers
IThis protection is necessitated by the special responsibilities of members of the
academic community:
The unique responsibilities of colleges and universities in the United States
are to extend the frontiers of knowledge, to make available to students the
wisdom and knowledge of the past, and to help them to develop their capacities for critical, independent thought. If these vital tasks are to be performed
with any degree of success, teachers in institutions of higher learning in this
country must be as free as possible from restraints and pressures which
inhibit independent thought and action. They must . . .be free to pursue
truth wherever it may lead.
Byse, Academic Freedom, Tenure, and the Law: A Comment on Worzella v. Board of
Regents, 73 H.av. L. REv. 304 (1959). For a discussion of the scope of academic freedom,
see the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, 60 A.A.U.P.
BuLL. 269, 270 (1974) [hereinafter cited as A.A.U.P. Statement of Principles]. See also
Fuchs, Academic Freedom-Its Basic Philosophy, Function, and History, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PaoS. 431 (1963); Machlup, On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academic
Freedom, 41 A.A.U.P. BuLL.753 (1955); Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 446 (1963); Pettigrew, "Constitutional Tenure:" Toward a Realization of Academic Freedom, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 475 (1971);
van den Haag, Academic Freedom in the United States, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 515
(1963); Note, Academic Freedom in the Public Schools: The Right to Teach, 48 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1176 (1973); Comment,.Academic Freedom in the United States, 40 U. CoLo. L. REV.
589 (1967).
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), the Supreme Court said:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which
is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment,
which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.
385 U.S. at 603. See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1968); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1960);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250, 261-64 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Adler v.
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 497 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting).
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from outside influences and pressures that could compromise
their ability to study and transmit knowledge to students.3
Because members of the academic community are dependent
upon teaching as a means of livelihood, a threat to their job
security is one method by which academic freedom can be curtailed.4 Dismissal or threat of dismissal has often been used by
school administrators to curtail the freedom of teachers who are
outspoken on controversial issues,5 who are sympathetic to causes
Tenure is the most common method by which academic freedom is protected and
it is designed to ensure
[flreedom of teaching and research and of extramural activities and . . . a
sufficient degree of economic security to make the profession attractive to
men and women of ability. Freedom and economic security, hence, tenure,
are indispensable to the success of an institution in fulfilling its obligations
to its students and to society.
A.A. U.P. Statement of Principles, at 270. While tenure does not guarantee lifetime employment, its "essential characteristic ... is continuity of service, in that the institution
in which the teacher serves has in some manner relinquished the freedom or power it
otherwise would possess to terminate the teacher's services." Byse, supra note 1, at 306.
Tenure, however, is dependent upon the teacher's continued efficient and good conduct.
See generally Academic Tenure at Harvard University, 58 A.A.U.P. BULL. 621 (1973);
Brewster, On Tenure, 58 A.A.U.P. BULL. 381 (1972); Davis, Enforcing Academic Tenure:
Reflections and Suggestions, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 200; Van Alstyne, Tenure: A Summary,
Explanation, and "Defense," 57 A.A.U.P. BULL. 1 (1971); VAN ALSTYNE, Constitutional
Rights of Professors and Teachers, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841; Note, Academic Tenure: The
Search for Standards, 39 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 593 (1966).
1 "Undoubtedly, most of the publicized issues of academic freedom have had to do
with attempted dismissals of professors [and] . . . . [Clontinuous or permanent tenure
is a most important means of protecting the principles of academic freedom" from such
dismissals. Machlup, supra note 1, at 760.
' See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (testimony before a legislative
committee); Ancanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974) (member of activist
homosexual organization); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 908 (1974) (involvement in political activities); Stolberg v. Board of Trustees, 474
F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973) (anti-Viet Nam war activity); Russo v. Center School Dist. No. 1,
469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1972) (symbolic protest of the quality
of American life); Toney v. Reagan, 467 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1130 (1973) (participation in anti-Viet Nam war rallies); Cook County College Teachers
v. Byrd, 456 F.2d 882 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972) (criticism of racism in
educational institutions); Fluker v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 441 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.
1971) (circulation of petitions); Whiteel v. Southeast Local School Dist. No. 1, 365 F.
Supp. 312 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd, 484 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir. 1973) (controversial religious
beliefs); Starsky v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 900 (D. Ariz. 1972) (attended demonstration
protesting arrest of students); Miller v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 54 F.R.D. 393
(W.D. Ky. 1971) (political involvements); Rackley v. School Dist. No. 5, 258 F. Supp. 676
(D.S.C. 1966) (attended demonstration); Kersey v. Maine Consol. School Dist. No. 10,
96 Ariz. 266, 394 P.2d 201 (1964) (involvement in community dispute); Ray v. Minneapolis
Bd. of Educ., 295 Minn. 13, 202 N.W.2d 375 (1972) (refusal to cooperate in course evaluation).
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antipathetic to positions espoused by the administration,, and
whose pedagogic style is incompatible with that considered proper by the administration. 7
As a result of the economic exigencies facing many school
systems, the job security of teachers has recently been threatened
by staff reductions necessitated by financial considerations.8
School administrations faced with dwindling enrollment and decreasing resources have viewed the dismissal of teachers as an
acceptable means of meeting monetary difficulties.' Such dismissals, however, can constitute a serious threat to academic
freedom if staff reductions are used as a means of either weeding
out dissidents"0 or dispensing with procedures designed to protect
' See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (public criticism of school
administration's policies); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (letter written
to newspaper critical of school board policies); Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 827 (1975) (irreconcilable conflicts with superiors); Skehan
v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3366
(U.S. Dec. 24, 1974) (No. 74-558) (stands on controversial campus issues contrary to
administration's stated position); Gieringer v. Center School Dist. No. 58, 477 F.2d 1164
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973) (impromptu criticisms of school administration); Duke v. North Tex. State Univ., 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
932 (1973) (public criticisms of school administration); Federation of Teachers, Local
1954 v. Hanover Community School Corp., 457 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1972) (contractual
dispute); Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1970) (remarks critical of school
administration).
I See, e.g., Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1974);
Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 135 (1974); Hetrick
v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1974); Clark v.
Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); Ewing v. Camacho,
411 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1971); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).
Noting the effect of this economic distress on the ability of teachers to find another
job, the court in Ducorbier v. Board of Supervisors, 386 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. La. 1974), said:
Plaintiff admits that when she was initially employed by [the university], persons qualified to teach . . .on the college level were in great demand. When plaintiff [resumed teaching after several years absence] there
was an oversupply of such persons when compared with demand for their
services. Plaintiff's inability to find employment may well be attributable
to [this] change in the job market . ...
Id. at 205 (footnotes omitted). See also notes 132-33 infra.
'See, e.g., American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super.
249, 322 A.2d 846 (Chan. Div. 1974). The college decided to dismiss teachers and abolish
its tenure system over such less extreme alternatives as lowering wages, reducing faculty
size by not filling vacancies, and not renewing the contracts of nontenured instructors.
Id. at 272, 322 A.2d at 858; see text accompanying notes 102-08 infra.
10See, e.g., Collins v. Wolfson, 498 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1974). See also text accompanying notes 23-51 infra.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 52

faculty members from arbitrary dismissals."
A dismissal justified by economic necessity may be improper
for a variety of reasons. The financial exigency, for example, may
be a fiction designed to aid a school administration in eliminating
the employment of a dissident faculty member" or replacing a
tenure system with one less onerous to the school.' 3 Even if the
crisis is genuine, the method of selecting which members must be
dismissed may violate the constitutional safeguards contained in
the due process clause. 4 Courts, when faced with a challenge to
a dismissal justified by financial exigency, must examine the
needs of the administration and the rights of the teachers in order
to determine whether the termination of employment infringes
5
the individual's academic freedom.'
The purpose of this note is to analyze the response of courts
to terminations resulting from a financial crisis threatening the
school. The response of the courts depends, in part, on whether
the teacher is asserting the infringement of a constitutional right,
such as freedom of expression,'" or the deprivation without due
process of the law of a property interest, such as a statutory" or
contractual'" right to employment. Therefore, this note will ana" See, e.g., American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super.
249, 322 A.2d 846 (Chan. Div. 1974). See also text accompanying notes 93-114 infra.
,2 See, e.g., State ex rel. Karnes v. Board of Regents, 222 Wis. 542, 269 N.W. 284
(1936), where the court refused to allow the board of regents to abolish the teaching post
of the plaintiff.
,3 See, e.g., American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super.
249, 322 A.2d 846 (Chan. Div. 1974).
" Compare Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974) with
Collins v. Wolfson, 498 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1974).
" The courts do not use a strict balancing test to determine whether the interest of
the school in reducing its faculty should prevail over the individual's interest in continued
employment; the courts are, however, cognizant of these conflicting interests. See, e.g.,
American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 322 A.2d
846 (Chan. Div. 1974).
11E.g., Collins v. Wolfson, 498 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1974), where the plaintiffs alldged
an infringement of their freedom of expression and a denial of due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. See text accompanying notes 23-51 infra.
," E.g., Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974), where the
plaintiffs alleged that they were deprived of a statutorily created tenure right to
reemployment without due process of law. See text accompanying notes 59-92 infra.
' E.g., American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249,
322 A.2d 846 (Chan. Div. 1974), where the plaintiffs were deprived of a contractually
created tenure right to reemployment by the abolition of the tenure system at Bloomfield
College. See text accompanying notes 93-108 infra.
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lyze each area separately and then examine the adequacy of court
protection of academic freedom threatened by financially required staff reductions.
I.

CHALLENGE TO DISMISSAL BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

A teacher's employment cannot be terminated for reasons
which infringe upon his exercise of a constitutionally protected
right.'9 Thus, if a teacher can establish a nexus between his exercise of expression, for example, and his dismissal, the termination
is an unconstitutional infringement of his first amendment
rights.20 In determining whether there is such a nexus,
[w]ith rights of liberty, such as the right of a faculty member to
be free from disability for engaging in speech protected by the first
amendment, the analysis starts with an inquiry into the substantive
reasons for whatever action is taken. If it is found that either termination or nonrenewal was [based on] the exercise of protected
speech . . . [then] the substantive decision is illegal as a matter
2

of constitutional law. '

This analysis, however, may fail if the school alleges that the
dismissal was in fact based upon financial considerations. This
allegation places a heavier burden of proof on the teacher to show
that the substantive reason for the dismissal was his exercise of
constitutional rights.2
" The government cannot condition a privilege upon a waiver of a constitutionally
protected right. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Rampey v. Allen,
501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 827 (1975); Skehan v. Board of
Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974); Simard v. Board of Educ., 473 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1973).
, Generally, the nexus must be established between a specific exercise of a constitutionally protected right and the dismissal. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Gierenger v. Center School Dist.
No. 58, 477 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973); Clark v. Holmes, 474
F.2d 928 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); Hostrop v. Board of Junior Colleges
Dist. No. 515, 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973); Russo v.
Center School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973); Duke
v. North Tex. State Univ., 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973);
Toney v. Reagan, 467 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130 (1973). For a
discussion of how Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct.
827 (1975), might not require such a nexus, see Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-Freedom
of Expression, 52 DENVER L.J. 82, 84-86 (1975).
" Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 38 (3d Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed,
43 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. Dec. 24, 1974) (No. 74-558), citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
" See text accompanying notes 40-42 infra. The allegation places a heavier burden
on the plaintiff because he must show not only that financial exigency was not the basis
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In Collins v. Wolfson2 the Miami-Dade Community College,

in order to implement a reduction in faculty size, decided not to
renew the contracts of four faculty members.2 The dismissed
employees then brought a section 19832 action alleging that the
"nonrenewals were effected pursuant to an arbitrary and subjective set of criteria employed by the Board of Trustees in ascertaining which teachers would not be rehired .... ",26 In addition
to this claim, two of the plaintiffs-Collins and Rivas-alleged
that the nonrenewal of their contracts infringed their constitutionally protected right of expression.Y
Collins, a nontenured instructor, claimed that "his nonrenewal was retaliatory in nature to punish him for participation in a
well-publicized political demonstration at the Democratic National Convention ....
,,21 The court, however, held that the
appeal should be dismissed as moot because Collins was subsefor the termination, but also that there was a nexus between the exercise of a constitutional right and the dismissal.
- 498 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1974).
2, Of the four faculty members whose contracts were not renewed, three-Collins,
Riley, and Rivas-were nontenured while the fourth-Hernhuter-was tenured. Because
Hernhuter was tenured and, therefore, had a property interest protectible under the fourteenth amendment, he was entitled to a "hearing, the purpose of which would be to assure
that his position was in fact 'discontinued' within the meaning of the contract.
... Id.
at 1104. The other three were not entitled to a hearing before dismissal because they were
nontenured and were thus accorded a lesser degree of protection by the court of appeals.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides, in part, the following:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation . . .
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen. . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law ....
" 498 F.2d at 1101.
21Id. The first amendment claim of Rivas was quickly disposed of by the court, which
held it could "find no conceivable claim embodied in Rivas' complaint, for he leaves to
mere conjecture the possibility that subjective standards could mask an improperly
grounded failure to renew." Id. at 1103. Thus, a mere allegation, without more, that a
reduction in staff is being used as a subterfuge to remove dissident faculty members is
inadequate to carry the plaintiff's burden of proof. However, a factual basis for such an
assertion may be sufficient to successfully challenge such a dismissal. In American Ass'n
of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846 (Chan. Div.
1974), for example, the plaintiffs successfully demonstrated that the abolition of tenure
and the dismissals of certain faculty members were not demonstrably bona fide and the
court refused to sustain the administration's actions. In Bloomfield, however, a contractual right was violated by the administration's actions and the burden of proof in a
situation like Collins would be on the plaintiffs to show the constitutional inadequacy of
the decision.
2 498 F.2d at 1101.
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quently rehired by the college pursuant to a rehiring policy that
gave priority to faculty members dismissed as the result of a staff
reduction."9 The court, therefore, did not find it necessary to determine whether the reason given by the administration or the
reason alleged by Collins was the true basis for the nonrenewal
of the contract.
In so holding, the Fifth Circuit in effect deprived Collins of
his cause of action under section 1983, which provides liability for
the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution." 30 The dismissal of the suit by the trial court
and the decision by the court of appeals took away from Collins
the opportunity to show whether constitutional rights had been
infringed and, if they were, whether damages should properly
have been awarded. While reinstatement is often viewed as the
proper remedy for a constitutionally impermissible termination
of employment, 31 it is not an exclusive remedy, and other remedies-such as the award of back pay or punitive damages-are
often found appropriate to compensate the plaintiff for the deprivation of his constitutional rights.32 The Fifth Circuit's holding,
in part, results from the fact that the administration justified its
actions by using the financial condition of the college as the basis
for the termination, and a different conclusion might have been
reached if this had not been the basis.3
" Id. at 1102. The court said that, "as a result of [his] restoration, [Collins no longer
had] a live controversy with the trustees." Id. The claim of the third appellant, Riley,
was also held to be moot because he was rehired under the same policy.
The court did not, however, indicate why it thought that there was no section 1983
claim remaining after the rehiring of the plaintiffs. One obvious argument is, because
the plaintiffs were rehired, the administration's claim of financial exigency as the basis
must be valid, for the school would not wish to rehire someone it fired in order to get him
off the faculty. This conclusion does not necessarily follow, because Collins alleged that
he was fired as a punishment and it is this punishment he claimed violated his constitutional rights and, therefore, gave rise to the school's section 1983 liability. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (emphasis added).
31 See, e.g., Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974), petition for cert.
filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. Dec. 24, 1974) (No. 74-558); McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314
(4th Cir. 1973); Stolberg v. Board of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973); Cooley v. Board
of Educ., 453 F.2d 282 (8th Cir. 1972); Rauls v. Board of Educ., 445 F.2d 825 (5th Cir.
1971); Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969); Olson v. Regents of Univ. of
Minn., 301 F. Supp. 1356 (D. Minn. 1969).
12Compare Collins with Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974),
petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. Dec. 24, 1974) (No. 74-558) and Smith v.
Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1973).
u One reason a different result might have been reached is that Collins would prob-
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The remaining appellant, Rivas, claimed that the criteria
used in selecting which faculty members would not be rehired was
arbitrary and subjective and, therefore, a deprivation of due
process under the fourteenth amendment . 3 In disposing of this
claim, the court held:
[O]nce the need arose to reduce the staff, the Board could employ
any device or standard to implement the reduction, such as arbitrarily drawing lots or otherwise leaving the decision to chance, so long
as the actual reason for the particular separation was not retribution
3 5
against the instructor's constitutionally protected conduct.

The only restriction imposed by the court upon the administrative decision is that the college is "confined to determining who
among qualified instructors is more or less expendable, rather
than deciding who on the faculty has so misbehaved as to warrant
36
dismissal for cause."
The difficulty with the court's analysis is that the administration could easily couch the dismissals in the language of a
permissible standard while in reality using constitutionally impermissible standards.3 7 In Johnson v. Branch,3 for example, the
ably not have been rehired, because there would have been no policy to rehire those
persons whose contracts were not renewed because of a staff reduction. Another is that
Collins would have had a lighter burden of proof, because he would not have to show both
the invalidity of the financial exigency and the nexus between his termination and an
exercise of a constitutional right.
498 F.2d at 1103
Id. at 1103-04.
Id. at 1103.

3 For examples of cases in which a school administration has used permissible
grounds for dismissal as a subterfuge in order to implement impermissible terminations
of employment, see Cook County College Teachers v. Byrd, 456 F.2d 882 (7th Cir. 1972)
(plaintiff alleged dismissals were retaliation for union activities and public positions taken
on racism in the university; court held that the dismissal was constitutional as it proceeded through the school's normal selection process); Fluker v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 441 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1971) (plaintiffs alleged dismissal based on circulation of
petitions and other antiadministration actions; court held dismissal proper in that it
resulted from a desire to strengthen the school's art and history departments); Johnson
v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966) (court sustained the plaintiffs allegation that the
dismissal was based on her civil rights activities over the school administration's claim
that the dismissal was based on her insubordination and refusal to cooperate with her
superiors); Whitsel v. Southeast Local School Dist. No. 1, 365 F. Supp. 312 (N.D. Ohio
1972), aff'd 484 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff alleged that the dismissal was based
on his criticism of the school board, his teaching of controversial subjects, and his personal
religious beliefs; the court held the dismissal was based on his participation in a student
demonstration and was constitutionally permissible); Williams v. Sumter School Dist.,
255 F. Supp. 397 (D.S.C. 1966) (court sustained plaintiffs contention that his dismissal
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reasons given for the nonrenewal of the teacher's contract were
"insubordination" and an "inability to perform those extracurricular duties required of her promptly and in a cooperative manner."3 The court, however, found that these grounds were not
the true basis for the dismissal and, instead, held that the plaintiff was dismissed, in part, because of her involvement in civil
rights activities.
In Johnson, which did not involve a reduction in faculty size,
the Fourth Circuit was able to question the school's credibility
and find that there was no factual basis for the reasons given for
the nonrenewal of the contract. 0 In a fact situation involving a
reduction in staff, however, the reduction in itself provides factual support for the dismissal. Because "someone on the faculty
[has] to go because of [the] reduction," a faculty member attempting to show that he was chosen for an improper reason has
a stronger presumption to rebut." The Fifth Circuit in Collins,
moreover, sanctioned the use "of any device or standard to implement the reduction" as long as the standard was not unconstitutional; however, this latitude in what constitutes a permissible
standard gives the administration greater resources in fabricating
constitutional excuses for what may be an unconstitutional termination of employment. 2
was based on his civil rights activities over the school's claim that the dismissal was
caused by the plaintiff's insubordination and lack of cooperation). See also K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 16.09 at 331 (1972), where Professor Davis says that persons
responsible for writing administrative decisions sometimes feel compelled to "dress up [a
decision] in verbiage that will make it look better than it is underneath."
364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966).
" Id. The basis for the allegations of insubordination and refusal to cooperate, the
court found, stemmed from the following matters:
[Bleing 15 minutes late to supervise an evening athletic contest; arriving
at the school building a few minutes after the prescribed sign-in time but
before any class was due to commence; failure to furnish a written explanation for not attending a P.T.A. meeting; failure to stand in the door of her
classroom to supervise pupils as the classes changed; and the failure to see
that the cabinets in her home room were clean and free of fire hazard.
Id. at 178. In his dissent, Judge Bryan said that the reasons given by the school administration were sufficient for not renewing the contract of the plaintiff. Id. at 182 (Bryan, J.,
dissenting).
40

Id.

Collins v. Wolfson, 498 F.2d 1100, 1103 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally DAvIs, supra
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 181 (1965).
11498 F.2d at 1103. Standards for differentiating faculty members might include
seniority, experience, publications, participation in school affairs, community involve"

note 37, §§ 29.01, .06; S.
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Rivas also claimed that the termination of his employment
deprived him of liberty without due process of law. In rejecting
this claim, the court said that under Board of Regents v. Roth43
only a termination that carries with it the implication of incompetence" or impropriety 5 infringes a person's liberty if there is no
hearing before the termination. A dismissal necessitated by a
staff reduction carries with it no negative implications, the court
held; it merely implies that "someone on the faculty had to go"
and "someone who otherwise would likely be invited to stay must
be relieved."" While it is unclear what constitutes a stigma sufficient to justify a deprivation of liberty under Roth,'7 the court
ignores the possibility that a termination justified by economic
necessity may be interpreted by future employers as a termination in reality based upon incompetence or impropriety."
ment, classroom achievement, interest in the future of the school, and family considerations. See Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227, 259 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
" 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
For examples of cases in which the dismissals carried implications of incompetence,
see Scheelhause v. Woodbury Central School Dist., 488 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 95 S. Ct. 255 (1974); Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973); Knarr v.
Board of School Trustees, 317 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd 452 F.2d 649 (7th Cir.
1971); Tsakiris v. Phoenix Union High School Sys., 18 Ariz. App. 416, 502 P.2d 1093
(1972); Conley v. Board of Educ., 143 Conn. 488, 123 A.2d 747 (1956); Stroman v. Board
of School Directors, 7 Pa. Commw. 418, 300 A.2d 286 (1973). In Weathers v. West Yuma
County School Dist. R-J-1, 387 F. Supp. 552, 559 (D. Colo. 1974), the allegations of
incompetence included the fact that the plaintiff's teaching methods "were ineffective in
that students did little more than 'take notes' and do 'busy work.'"
" For examples of cases in which the dismissals carried implications of impropriety,
see Ancanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974) (homosexual conduct);
Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973) (told students "I am an unwed mother");
Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973) (unsubstantiated allegations of sexual
conduct with younger man); Bradford v. School Dist. No. 20, 364 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1966)
(public drunkenness and disorderly conduct); Jerry v. Board of Educ., 35 N.Y,2d 534, 324
N.E.2d 106 (1974) (allegations of sexual misconduct with student).
41 498 F.2d at 1103.
4' In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972), the Supreme Court held that if a termination infringes a person's interest
in "liberty," then he is entitled to a hearing before that deprivation.
"
For a discussion of the repercussions of a dismissal from employment as a teacher,
see Schulman, Employment of Nontenured Faculty: Some Implications of Roth and
Sinderman, 51 DENVER L.J. 215, 220-24 (1974). In Russo v. Center School Dist. No. 1,
469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973), for example, the plaintiff
was unable to find work after her contract was not renewed despite "a highly satisfactory
teacher observation report. . . and further academic achievement." Schulman, supra, at
222. Ducorbier v. Board of Supervisors, 386 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. La. 1974), suggests that a
university is "under no duty to determine whether the job market [can] absorb [a
teacher] before" terminating his employment. Id. at 205, citing Perkins v. Regents of
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A teacher challenging a dismissal that is justified by his employers as required by economic necessity has a heavy burden of
proof. The mere allegation that the termination was in reality
based upon his exercise of a constitutional right is inadequate,
because the school's claim of financial exigency in itself provides
a substantive basis for the decision that is not unconstitutional.4 9
Moreover, courts may be unwilling to interfere with the discretion
of the school's administration as to either the necessity of
dismissals or the choice of whom should be dismissed. 0 Thus, in
the absence of a property right based on a contractual or statutory
provision, the constitutional protection afforded a faculty member dismissed as the result of a reduction in staff is often inadequate.5 '
II. CHALLENGE TO DIsMissAL BASED ON PROPERTY RIGHT
A person has a protectible interest, similar to a property
right, in his employment if he has
more than an abstract need or desire for [the continued
employment]. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of
it. He must, indeed, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.,'

This claim of entitlement to continued employment is more than
a mere belief that one will be rehired 3 or a subjective, unilateral
expectation of reemployment." This legitimate claim of entitlement may arise either through the creation of such an interest by
the state55 or by the creation of a contractual relationship. 5
Univ. of Calif., 353 F. Supp. 618, 623-24 (C.D. Cal. 1973). See also text accompanying
notes 131-32 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227, 236-38 (W.D. Wis. 1974);
American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 267-68, 322
A.2d 846, 855-56 (Chan. Div. 1974).
11 If, for some reason, the protection afforded by a contract or statute does not apply,
then the underlying constitutional protection still remains. Compare Skehan v. Board of
Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. Dec.
24, 1974) (No. 74-558), with Cusumano v. Ratchford, 507 F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1974), and
Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974). But cf. Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
52 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). For a recent Supreme Court
interpretation of Roth and the property interest it creates, see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974).
1 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 134 (1974).
4 See, e.g., Ducorbier v. Board of Supervisors, 386 F. Supp. 202, 208 (E.D. La. 1974).
In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Court held:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
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If a teacher has a recognized property interest in continued
employment, he cannot be deprived of this interest without the
due process of law guaranteed by the Constitution. 7 When confronted by a challenge to a dismissal that is alleged to infringe
the plaintiff's property interest in continued employment, a court
must determine,
under the applicable state law, the nature and extent of the . . .
right and, if the . . . right has been terminated other than by the
expiration of its term, to consider whether the method of termination comported with the fourteenth amendment procedural due process."

Thus, in situations in which a dismissal was necessitated by financial exigencies, the court must determine whether the termination infringed the rights of a teacher who had a property interest
in his continued employment.
A.

Statutorily Created Interest in Continued Employment

In Johnson v. Board of Regents" the Wisconsin Legislature
reduced by 5 percent the base budget for the University of Wisconsin System and required a decrease in enrollment in the system's campuses. 0 This reduction led administrative officials to
the conclusion that "there would be insufficient funds available
to continue to pay the salaries of all tenured members of the
faculty and staff in all departments of all campuses."'" Faced
with this forced reduction of the budget, university officials decided to discontinue the employment of some tenured faculty
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits.
Id. at 577.
1 Justice Powell recently said that a "person may have a protected property interest
in public employment if contractual or statutory provisions guarantee continued employment absent 'sufficient cause' for discharge." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 165 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring), citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972).
7 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Schulman, supra note 48.
5'Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 38 (3d Cir. 1974), petitionfor cert. filed,

43 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. Dec. 24, 1974) (No. 74-558).
377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
o Id. at 230.

Id. As in American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super.
249, 322 A.2d 846 (Chan. Div. 1974), the administration apparently did not consider other,
less extreme alternatives. See note 9 supra.
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members and created a procedure for determining which faculty
members they would "lay-off""2 and a means by which this deci3
sion could be appealed.1
After following this procedure, the university laid off 38 tenured faculty members who then brought an action seeking declaratory relief." The plaintiffs, claiming that the university's
method of determining which faculty members would be terminated violated the procedural due process guaranteed them by
the fourteenth amendment, relied on a Wisconsin statute as the
basis for their claim. This statute, in part, provides that a
teacher's "employment shall be permanent, during efficiency and
good behavior" and that such employment "may not be terminated involuntarily, except for cause upon written charges." 5
Because there were neither written charges nor allegations of inefficiency or bad behavior, the teachers complained that having
their employment terminated deprived them of a property right
without due process of law. 6
'1 The regents decided to use the term "lay-off" rather than "terminate" or "dismiss"
because
the applicable state statutes did not specify fiscal exigency as a basis for
termination of tenured faculty; that the persons affected would continue as
tenured faculty members (but without pay and without duties); that the
persons affected would be entitled to "first refusal" for reinstatement to their
positions if funds again became available within two years; that efforts to
find other employment for them within the System were being made and
would continue to be made; and that the term "lay-off" avoids an implication that any act or omission of the person caused the University's action.
377 F. Supp. at 231.
' Id. at 232-33.
6, The plaintiffs brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) alleging a deprivation of due process and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) seeking a "preliminary injunction to
require defendants to continue the plaintiffs in their present employment unless and until
minimal procedural due process is afforded them." 377 F. Supp. at 230.
5 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 37.31 (1974-75 Supp.) provides, in part, as follows:
(1)(a) All teachers in any state university shall be employed on probation. The employment shall be permanent, during efficiency and good behavior, after appointment and acceptance thereof for a sixth consecutive
year in the state university system as a teacher. An official leave of absence,
part-time or fulltime, or a teacher improvement assignment, shall not constitute a break in continuous service, nor shall it count toward the time required to attain tenure.
(b) The employment of a teacher who has become permanently employed under this section may not be terminated involuntarily, except for
cause upon written charges . ..
66 The procedures that the plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to as a matter of due
process of law are those contained in id. § 37.31(1)(b), which provides, in part, that
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The court first determined that the statutory right of tenure
created by the legislature is not limited by financial considerations. In listing the applicable grounds for involuntarily terminating a tenured faculty member's employment, the statute nowhere
provides that a teacher can be terminated "because of reduced
student enrollment or because of considerations of economy, or
both." 7 To reach a contrary conclusion would result in the anomalous interpretation that the statute afforded more protection to
an incompetent teacher, who could be dismissed only according
to the statutory procedures, than to a teacher in good standing,
whose property interest in continued employment did not require
procedural protection if the reasons for the dismissal were economic considerations."8
The court in Johnson, however, did not require that the full
procedures contained in the statute" had to be followed before the
38 plaintiffs were dismissed." In deciding how much procedure
[wlithin 20 days of receiving the written notice that his employment has
been terminated, such permanently employed teacher may appeal the termination to the board of regents by a written notice to the president of the
board of regents. The board of regents shall hear the case and provides such
teacher with a written statement as to its decision. The action and decision
of the board of regents in the matter shall be final, subject to judicial review
67 377 F. Supp. at 234. In reaching such a conclusion, the court in Johnson is apparently in conformity with Wisconsin case law. In State ex rel. Ball v. McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d
190, 203-04, 269 N.W. 711, 718 (1959), overruled in part on other grounds, 39 Wis. 2d 595,
159 N.W.2d 630 (1968), the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted section 37.31 and said:
We wish to take sharp issue with . . . the contention . . . .[t]hat the
statute vests sole discretion in the board to determine for itself what...
constitutes good cause for discharge. Such an interpretation of the statute
would tend to completely destroy its obvious objective of assuring security
of tenure to a teacher.
' See text accompanying notes 84-92 infra.
99 CompareWis. STAT. ANN. §§ 37.31(1)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1974-75) with 377 F. Supp. 23233.
7 Due process can, of course, vary with the substantive rights that are sought to be
protected. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1970), the Court said, "The
formality and procedural requisites [necessary to satisfy due process] can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings." Thus, the statutory procedures are not necessarily the only ones that will
satisfy the procedural due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. In Johnson
the court stated that due process required only that the dismissed teacher have the right
to show
that the true reason for his or her lay-off was a constitutionally impermissible
reason; or. . .that, given the chain of decisions which preceded the ultimate
decision designating him or her by name for lay-off, that ultimate decision
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was required by this statutory right to employment, the court
applied the Supreme Court's decision in Arnett v. Kennedy." In
Arnett, the appellant was discharged under procedures he alleged
"denied [him] due process of law because they failed to provide
for a trial-type hearing before an impartial agency official prior
to removal .
"..."72In affirming the dismissal, Justice Rehnquist, in an opinion joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Stewart, held that the entity which created the substantive right to
employment could also define "the procedure provided for its
enforcement."73 Therefore, the Court held, the procedure to enforce a statutory right is not constitutional in origin, but rather
was nevertheless wholly arbitrary and unreasonable.
377 F. Supp. at 240. In criticism of the due process protection given by the court in
Johnson, it has been said that
the plaintiffs' had a constitutional claim to "some minimal procedural protection." But that protection was minimal indeed, in that the court declined
to prescribe any faculty participation in the separation decisions, once "reasonably adequate" statements of reasons were provided by the administration, with some opportunity for the faculty member to respond.
The Bloomfield College Case, 60 A.A.U.P. BULL. 320 (1974), quoting Johnson v. Board of
Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227, 240 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
71 416

U.S. 134 (1974).

Id. at 139. The plaintiff, an employee at the Chicago Regional Office of the Office
of Economic Opportunity, was dismissed after publicly stating that his superior had
"attempted to bribe a representative of a community action organization." Id. at 137. The
2

superior then notified the plaintiff that he would be removed from his position as the result
of making the unsubstantiated statement. Id. at 138.
7' Id. at 152. The Court, as justification for this conclusion, said that
that right, a right which had previously existed only by virtue of administrative regulation, expressly provided also for the procedure by which "cause"
was to be determined, and expressly omitted the procedural guarantees
which appellee insists are mandated by the Constitution. . . . Congress was
obviously intent on according a measure of statutory job security to governmental employees which they had not previously enjoyed, but was likewise
intent on excluding more elaborate procedural requirements which it felt
would make the operation of the new scheme unnecessarily burdensome in
practice.
Id. Thus, Justice Rehnquist's opinion implies that the owner of a property right, which
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972), accorded constitutional protection, may be denied that full protection if the creator of the property interest does not include the procedural protections Roth and
Sindermann held the owner was entitled to have. In his dissent, Justice Marshall notes
that this in effect makes the property interest similar to the privilege of governmental
employment that was found to exist in Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). 416 U.S. 211 n.7 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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only such as "Congress has designated" without any additional
due process procedural protection.74
It could be agued under Arnett, then, that the authority
creating the property interest in employment could, in situations
not clearly delineated by the statute, define how much, if any,
procedural protection is to be given in those situations. 5 As applied to Johnson, the authority of the University of Wisconsin
System to determine the procedural due process to be accorded
faculty members dismissed as the result of economic exigency
would be based upon the statute creating the property interest in
teaching rather than the Federal Constitution. Thus, the statute,
rather than the fourteenth amendment, would determine the protection to be given a tenured teacher; this view, however, was
rejected in Johnson.7 6
Instead, the court noted that the majority of the Supreme
Court did not agree with Justice Rehnquist's opinion that the
statute, rather than the Constitution, dictates the procedural due
process an employee is entitled to receive.77 The district court
concluded that
', 416 U.S. at 152. The Court said that reading in additional constitutional procedural
protections could be done "[o]nly by bifurcating the very sentence of the Act of Congress
" Id.
which conferred . . . the right not to be removed save for cause ....
11As in the plurality's opinion in Arnett, it could equally well be argued that the State
of Wisconsin, had it so chosen, could have included the procedural guarantees of the
Federal Constitution. How this should be done, however, is something the plurality does
not state. See id. at 151-52. Given the wide variety of cases in which requisite due process
involved in a hearing might be an issue, the legislature in drafting such a statute would
have to possess an unusual degree of prescience to know what the Constitution requires
as a matter of due process because due process varies so considerably from situation to
situation. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (repossession of consumer
goods); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (nonrenewal of teaching contract);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972) (repossession of consumer goods); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (revocation
of driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1967) (garnishment of wages); Greene
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (discharge of employment from government contractor).
See generally Comment, Constitutional Law-Due Process-PrejudgmentSeizure of
Property, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), 52 DENVER L.J. 619, 621-25,
632 (1975), where the author describes "the inconsistent standards of due process." This
problem could be avoided if, rather than accepting the plurality's approach of selective
incorporation by legislatures of the due process clause, the procedural due process required
for termination of employment was independent of statutes. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134, 207, 211 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71377 F. Supp. at 235.
" In his dissent, which was joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, Justice Marshall
noted that
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once the entity creating the position has afforded it the attribute of
permanence or "tenure," then the due process clause of the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment determines the minimal procedural protection which must attend termination or lay-off."8

Because the statute was inapplicable to these particular terminations, the court did not require the board of regents to follow the
statutory procedures for termination.7 9 Instead, the court applied
the minimal due process requirements that underlie the statute's
procedures and held that the fourteenth amendment required
only protection from "termination or lay-off for a constitutionally
impermissible reason. . . and from termination or lay-off which
is wholly arbitrary and unreasonable." 80
In so concluding, the court ignored the plaintiff's claim that
the dismissal was in itself a violation of the fourteenth amendment. Arguably, what violates the plaintiff's fourteenth amendment rights is not the actual procedures the administration followed in Johnson, but rather the fact that the terminations were
allowed to take place for reasons and under procedures that were
a majority of the Court rejects Mr. Justice Rehnquist's argument that because appellee's entitlement arose from statute, it could be conditioned on
a statutory limitation of procedural due process, an approach which would
render such protection inapplicable to the deprivation of any statutory benefit.
416 U.S. at 211 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In a concurring opinion in which he was joined
by Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell found the constitutional protections of the fifth and

fourteenth amendments applicable. Id. at 164 (Powell, J!, concurring). In a separate
opinion, Justice White found the "principles of due process" applicable when "a person
is finally deprived of his property" interest in employment. Id. 178 (White, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part).
377 F. Supp. at 235.
T'The court concluded that
7

the Wisconsin legislature has invested plaintiffs' employment with a sufficient degree of permanence to prevent termination or lay-off, for whatever
reason, without some minimal procedural protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment, whatever the elements of that protection may be.
Id. at 235. See criticism of this conclusion in note 70 supra.
" 377 F. Supp. at 239. In the court's view, the "minimal procedures" required at least
furnishing each plaintiff with a reasonably adequate written statement of the
basis for initial decision to lay-off;
furnishing each plaintiff with a reasonably adequate description of the manner in which the initial decision had been arrived at;
making a reasonably adequate disclosure to each plaintiff of the information
and- data upon which the decision-makers had relied; and
providing each plaintiff the opportunity to respond.
Id. at 240. See criticisms of this "minimal" procedure in The Bloomfield College Case,
supra note 70.
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not contained in the statute creating the property interest in
continued employment. 8 1 The property interest of the Wisconsin
teachers was, by administrative fiat, limited by the addition of a
new cause for dismissal-declining student enrollment and legislative paring of the budget.82 The court purported to reject just
such a view,8 3 but by allowing the dismissals to stand it sanctioned the limitation of the property interest.
The court's rationale, moreover, reaches the same result it
would have reached had it followed Justice Rehnquist's plurality
opinion.S' Under the plurality's approach in Arnett, the university
system acting for the legislative creator of the property interest
may dictate "the procedural limitations which [accompany] the
grant of the interest."81 In Johnsonthis was done when the university system was allowed to decide that tenure would have to be
limited by economic considerations and different procedures were
followed than those specified by the statute.88 The court then
sanctioned these procedures as satisfying the requirements of the
due process clause. 7 Although the court's approach in Johnson
resulted in a judicial sanction of procedures not required under
the plurality's opinion in Arnett, s8 the protection that Roth and
Sindermann accorded an existing property interest in continued
employment has been circumvented by a lower procedural requirement for dismissals justified by economic reasons. The adequacy of the statutory protection of the Wisconsin tenure act is
limited because the creator of the interest and the university
administration can redefine its extent and procedural protections. 9
The weakness of statutory protection of academic freedom is
revealed by the court's response in Johnson to a staff reduction
necessitated by economic considerations. Given the bona fide
" 377 F. Supp. at 230-31. For the procedures and reasons for dismissals, see notes 6566 supra.
R' See text accompanying notes 59-64 supra. See also 377 F. Supp. at 234-35.
377 F. Supp. at 235.
' See text accompanying notes 72-76 supra.
416 U.S. at 155.
, See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra.
'7 377 F. Supp. at 240-42.
U See 416 U.S. at 163, where the Court concluded that there was no necessity for
"procedural protection beyond that afforded here by the statute and related agency regulations."
", See text accompanying notes 69-76 supra.
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nature of the necessity of the dismissals and the ambiguous tenure statute, the court was compelled to abandon the statutory
procedures designed to protect academic freedom. 0 Because all
of the faculty members in Johnson were qualified and because the
employment of some had to be terminated, the opportunity to
prove that the dismissal was actually based on an impermissible
ground was greatly reduced." The plaintiffs in Johnson had to
show that the decision was "wholly arbitrary and unreasonable"
in order to prevail and this, in reality, was impossible because the
underlying basis for the decision-the economic reduction in
staff-meant that the decision could not possibly be wholly arbitrary.2
B.

Contractually Created Interest in Continued Employment

In American Association of University Professors v. Bloomfield College" the Board of Trustees of Bloomfield College, faced
with decreasing enrollment and an increasing cash deficit,' 4
decided to reduce the staff by eliminating 13 teaching positions.
At the same time the board found it necessary to place the remaining professors on a 1-year terminal contract and thereby
eliminate the college's existing tenure system. 5 The plaintiff
" The court accepted as bona fide the administration's decision to reduce the faculty
without requiring the administration to show that less extreme alternatives, such as not
replacing retiring faculty, were not available. See note 61 supra. The court felt that the
decision to terminate was the result of a series of decisions that the due process clause
did not require the court to inquire into. See 377 F. Supp. 236-39.
See 377 F. Supp. at 240.
,' Id. at 239 (emphasis added). If the decision has any legally admissible evidence
sustaining it, such as a showing of economic necessity, it is not wholly arbitrary and will
be sustained by a court reviewing the administrative action. See generally K. DAviS, supra
note 37, §§ 14.07-.09, .13.
:3 129 N.J. Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846 (Chan. Div. 1974).
" Enrollment in 1973-74 was 867 students, down from 1,069 in 1972. Id. at 255, 322
A.2d at 849. The cash deficit "for 1972 was $123,000 and for 1973 $191,000, with estimates
that it will probably rise to $231,000 for the year." Id. at 257, 322 A.2d at 850. The court
said that
enrollment will continue to drop for the following three reasons: (1) the pool
from which the college has historically drawn in terms of age and economic
background is itself being diminished; (2) inability to develop a sufficiently
attractive academic program; and (3) costs. In addition . . . the area is ...
overburdened with educational facilities in terms of existing need.
Id. at 258-59, 322 A.2d at 851. For a thorough discussion of the economic problems facing
Bloomfield College, see Academic Freedom and Tenure: Bloomfield College (New Jersey),
60 A.A.U.P. BULL. 50 (1974).
11 129 N.J. Super. at 255, 322 A.2d at 849.
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brought this action seeking reappointment of those faculty members whose employment had been terminated and a "declaratory
judgment that [the professors'] tenured status is unaffected by
the action of board of trustees."9
The basis for the plaintiff's action was that the contract provided that
a teacher will have tenure and his services may be terminated only
for adequate cause, except in cases of extraordinarycircumstances
because of financial exigency. 7

The contract further stated that "[tiermination of continuous
employment because of financial exigency of the institution must
be demonstrably bona fide."9 Thus, the contract limited the situations in which a tenured faculty member could be terminated
to those in which the trustees' actions were 1) justified by extraordinary circumstances and 2) demonstrably bona fide."
The court first determined whether the current financial difficulties of Bloomfield College constituted the "extraordinary circumstances" which, under the contract, would allow the administration to dismiss tenured faculty. Extraordinary circumstances,
the court held, arise from situations so extreme that the college
is forced to take measures "reasonably calculated to preserve its
existence as an academic institution" and not from those situations in which the college is merely "under financial distress and
. . . 'something [has] to be done.' "' In determining whether
96Id.
'7

Id. at 253, 322 A.2d at 849.

Id. (emphasis added). In the A.A.U.P. Statement of Principles,at 270, subsection
5 of the Academic Tenure section provides that "[tiermination of a continuous appointment because of a financial exigency should be demonstrably bona fide." In 1974, the
American Association of University Professors proposed the following regulation for termination of employment on the basis of financial exigency:
Termination of an appointment with continuous tenure, or of a probationary
or special appointment before the end of the specified term, may occur under
extraordinary circumstances because of a demonstrably bona fide financial
exigency which cannot be alleviated by less drastic means.
Discontinuance of a Program, Employment, Department, or Medical Reasons, 60
A.A.U.P. BULL. 411 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Revision of Regulation 4].
The court said:
That the parties intended that this evaluation [of the tenure] policy
not be left to the college free of restraint is shown by their choice of conditions (1) that the Board's actions be demonstrably bona fide, (2) extraordinary circumstances .

...

129 N.J. Super. at 266, 322 A.2d at 855.
11 Id. at 264, 322 A.2d at 855.
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the former or latter situation faced the college, the court considered the following factors: the duty of the board of trustees to
"manage the business of the college . . . in light of its own best
business judgment free from outside interference" and the "nature and extent of academic tenure."'' °
The court examined the financial difficulties facing the college'02 and concluded that these problems, while severe, did not
justify a conclusion that a "financial exigency" or "extraordinary
circumstances" existed. Because the school's "financial problem
[was] one of liquidity, which . . . had plagued the college for
many years," the school's current distress could be characterized
as neither exigent nor extraordinary within the meaning of the
contract.0 3 The financial difficulties of the college were not sufficient to justify the abolition of tenure; this conclusion led the
court to examine the good faith of the college in deciding to abolish tenure.'0
The administration "failed to demonstrate by a preponder05
ance of the evidence that their . . . action was in good faith.'
Because there was no immediate financial benefit that could have
"0" Id. at 267-68, 322 A.2d at 855-56; see Thomas v. Board of Educ., 89 N.J. Super.
327, 215 A.2d 35 (App. Div. 1965), aff'd 46 N.J. 851, 218 A.2d 630 (1966); Quinlan v. Board
of Educ., 73 N.J. Super. 40, 179 A.2d 161. (App. Div. 1962). The court in Bloomfield
described the considerations as follows:
[T]he obligation incumbent upon the board of trustees to manage the business of the college, to appraise and project existing and future needs and
resources and to act in light of its own best judgment free of outside interferences; its duty to honor solemnly undertaken tenure commitments, the
objective data relating to the college's financial circumstances, its financial
history, the authenticity of the financial threat; evaluations expressed by
the board of trustees, the existence of real alternatives to the action taken,
and the nature and extent of academic tenure itself.
129 N.J. Super. at 267-68, 322 A.2d at 855-56.
"I See note 95 supra. The court also considered the fact that the college had lost it
status as a prime lending risk, which caused its borrowing costs to increase, and that its
college endownment fund had decreased by 21 percent. 129 N.J. Super. at 258, 322 A.2d
at 850.
03 129 N.J. Super. at 270, 322 A.2d at 857. The court also considered the fact that 12
new, nontenured faculty were hired in the "period during which the action complained of
took place" and that the university owned property, the value of which was "conservatively estimated at between 11/2 and 4 million dollars." Id. at 269, 270, 322 A.2d at 856,
857.
", The court said that the college "cannot reasonably support its claim of demonstrably bona fide exigency." Id. at 271, 322 A.2d at 857.
,05Id. at 268, 322 A.2d at 856.
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been derived from abolishing the existing tenure system, the
court concluded that the abolition "could not have been inspired
by financial exigency."' 5 The true concern of the administration
in abolishing tenure was not in resolving a financial emergency,
but rather in implementing a long-standing desire that "the present tenure system be abolished and that a new term-contract
system be established.' ' 7 Thus, both the dismissal of the tenured
faculty members and the abolition of tenure were improper in
that the reason given for the action-the financial exigency
threatening the institution-was a subterfuge to avoid the college's contractual obligations with its faculty.1 8 The court, therefore, refused to sanction the abolition of tenure and reinstated the
dismissed faculty members.
The adequacy of contractual protection of academic freedom
depends upon the adequacy of the contract creating the protection. In Bloomfield College the contract provided a means by
which the court could gauge the propriety of the college administration's actions. Through the use of precisely defined terms, such
as "financial exigency" and "extraordinary circumstances," the
court was able to determine whether the teachers' rights were
infringed by the abolition of tenure."' The contract, therefore,
provided the court with an adequate framework within which to
ascertain and protect the rights of the teachers.
If, however, the contract does not precisely define the rights
of the parties, then the adequacy of the contractual protection is
effectively diminished. In Cusumano v. Ratchford,"" the applicable language, which was incorporated by reference into the contract,"' provided that notice
106Id.

to Id. at 272, 322 A.2d at 858, quoting a report to the board of trustees from the
college's Commission to Review Tenure and Retirement Policy, dated June 21, 1973. The
court noted that the report "clearly focuses upon the issue of the 'tenure system,' not with
a bona fide attempt to reconcile the fact of tenure with the reality of a true financial
exigency.

. .

."

Id.

The court said that "[clourta have not hesitated to invalidate the dismissal of
tenured personnel where the reasons of economy given were shown to have been used as a
subterfuge." Id., citing, inter alia, Wall v. Board of Educ., 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967);
Chambers v. Board of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966).
'
See 129 N.J. Super. at 263-64, 322 A.2d at 854.
18 507 F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 982.
"I
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should be given at least one year prior to the expiration of the probationary period, if the teacher is not to be continued in service after
the expiration of that period."12

The court held that this language, clearly "precatory on its face,"
was not intended to be "a legal binding document."" 3 A failure
to give notice of intended termination of employment was, as a
result, not violative of the teaching contract. Furthermore, because the mode of termination did not violate the underlying due
process protection of the fourteenth amendment, the court sustained the dismissals."'
CONCLUSION

The protection of academic freedom has always involved a
conflict between the interests of the institution and the individual. School administrators need discretion in day-to-day as well
as long-range decisions as to the composition, size, and quality
of their faculty;" 5 individual scholars need job security in order
to teach, research, and study effectively." 6 The conflict between
these interests increases appreciably when the school administration determines that the deteriorating financial condition of the
institution has become so severe that faculty size must be decreased if the school is to survive.
To resolve this conflict, it must first be determined whether
the financial exigency is, indeed, a financial exigency. It should
not be enough that the school is facing financial difficulties that
a reduced faculty size might alleviate; instead, the financial exigency must be of such severity that members of the faculty must
be dismissed if the school is to weather the crisis." 7 If evidence
exists that the school is not acting in good faith"' or if a financial
crisis does not in fact exist,"' the terminations of employment
should not be sustained because it is quite possible that economic
112Id. at 985.

Id.
See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
"' See text accompanying note 101 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 1-4 supra.
"7 See, e.g., American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J.
Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846 (Chan. Div. 1974).
"'By rehiring, for example, the exact number of nontenured faculty as it dismissed
of tenured faculty, the school might not be exercising good faith. See id.
11' Id.
113

"'
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necessity is being used as a2 subterfuge to mask unconstitutional
reasons for the dismissals. 1
If a financial crisis does exist and there is no alternative to a
reduction in faculty size, the dismissals should be upheld only if
there is adequate protection of the rights of the individual. Dismissals, even though necessitated by financial considerations,
should not be used as a means of eliminating dissident teachers
or faculty members distasteful to an administration. One way of
insuring that this does not happen is to utilize faculty participation in the termination decisions.' 2 ' The American Association of
University Professors has proposed, in cases involving terminations necessitated by financial considerations, that
[tihe faculty or an appropriate faculty body should . . . exercise
primary responsibility in determining the criteria for identifying the
individuals whose appointments are to be terminated.
The responsibility for identifying individuals whose appointments are to be terminated should be committed to a person or a
22
group designated or approved by the faculty.
See notes and text accompanying notes 5-7 and 19-21 supra.
Proposed Revision of Regulation 4. The Association also recommends faculty participation in determining the school's budget. See The Role of the Faculty in Budgetary
'

and Salary Matters, 58 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 170 (1972).
"2

Proposed Revision of Regulation 4. The regulation reads in part as follows:
(1) Termination of an appointment with continuous tenure, or of a
probationary or special appointment before the end of the specified term,
may occur under extraordinary circumstances because of a demonstrably
bona fide financial exigency which cannot be alleviated by less dramatic
means.
[NOTE: Each institution ... will need to decide how to share and allocate
the hard judgments and decisions that are necessary in such a crisis.
As a first step, there should be a faculty body which participates in the
decision that a condition of financial exigency exists or is imminent.
...The case of a faculty member given notice of proposed termination
of appointment will be governed by the following procedure.]
(2) If the administration issues notice to a particular faculty member
of an intention to terminate the appointment because of financial exigency,
the faculty member will have the right to a full hearing before a faculty
committee. .

.

. The issues in this hearing may include:

(i) The existence and extent of the condition of financial exigency. The burden will rest on the administration to prove the
existence and extent of the condition. . ..
(ii) The validity of the educational judgments and the criteria for
identification for termination; but the recommendations of a faculty body on these matters will be considered prima facie valid.
(iii) Whether the criteria are being properly applied in the individual case.
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The teacher whose employment has been terminated should, in
addition, be afforded the right to challenge the decision, regardless of who made it. This challenge should include an opportunity
to question (1) the validity of the financial justification for the
decision, (2) the validity of the criteria for deciding who was to
be terminated, and (3) whether the criteria were properly exercised.'23
While these proposed procedures may protect academic freedom from economically necessitated staff reductions, the problem of implementing them still remains. The due process clause
of the Constitution currently does not require procedures of this
thoroughness to be followed before a school system can terminate
the employment of a nontenured faculty member.'24 While teachers who have acquired tenure under a state statute are afforded
a greater degree of protection than their nontenured colleagues,
this protection may be less than that suggested above'25 and, in
some cases, may be varied by school administrators.'2 6 Contractually created tenure probably affords the greatest possibility of
protection because the procedures can be delineated in the em(3) If an institution because of financial exigency terminates appointments, it will not at the same time renew fixed-term appointments or make
new appointments except in extraordinary circumstances . . . . [A] faculty
member with tenure will not be terminated in favor of retaining a faculty
member without tenure.
(6) In all cases of termination of appointment because of financial
exigency, the place of the faculty member concerned will not be filled by a
replacement within a period of three years, unless the released faculty member has been offered reinstatement and a reasonable time in which to accept
or decline it.
123 Id.
2I Compare Proposed Revision of Regulation 4 with Collins v. Wolfson, 498 F.2d 1100
(5th Cir. 1974), and Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
"2 Compare the procedural requirements of Proposed Revision of Regulation 4 with
that required by the court in Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis.
1974).
"2IE.g., State ex rel. Piper v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 213 La. 885, 35
So. 2d 804 (1948), where the court allowed the school board a reasonable time after the
expiration of a teacher's probationary period to grant tenure under LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17:441-64 (Supp. 1975), and Johnson v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis.
1974), where the court varied the provisions of Wis. STAT. ANN. § 37.31 (Supp. 1974-75)
to allow the dismissals for reasons not contained in the statute. Contra, State ex rel. Ball
v. McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d 190, 94 N.W.2d 711 (1959), overruled in part on other grounds, 39
Wis. 2d 595, 159 N.W.2d 630 (1968), discussed in note 67 supra.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 52

ployment contract and a court can then order that they be followed by requiring specific performance of the contract.'27
Obtaining such contractual protection, however, may become increasingly difficult. One means of doing so is through the
process of collective bargaining, but there is uncertainty as to
with whom the teachers should bargain,'28 the proper scope of the
bargaining,2 9 and even whether collective bargaining is feasible
in the academic environment. 30 The situation is further exacerbated by the declining base population of students and the financial hardships facing many institutions-particularly private universities. 31 These economic problems are likely to result in fewer
job opportunities and a weakened bargaining position for teachers
who might be unable to effectively negotiate for procedural protection of academic freedom. 32 Even if a contract containing such
protection is negotiated, its provisions could still be avoided by
an administration that refuses to give tenure either by requiring
"ISee American Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249,
322 A.2d 846 (Chan. Div. 1974); cf. Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C.
1967), rev'd on other grounds, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Sarokhan v. Fair Lawn
Memorial Hosp., Inc., 83 N.J. Super. 127, 199 A.2d 52 (App. Div. 1962), cert. denied, 42
N.J. 501, 201 A.2d 580 (1964).
'2 See, e.g., Wollett, The Status and Trends of Collective Negotiations For Faculty
in Higher Education, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 2, 23-24, where the author suggests that as many
as nine possible levels exist where negotiation may occur. See also Johnson v. Board of
Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227, 236-38 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
" See, e.g., Moskow, The Scope of Collective Bargaining in HigherEducation, 1971
Wis. L. REV. 33; Sands, The Role of Collective Bargainingin HigherEducation, 1971 Wis.
L. REV. 150.
3 See generally Brown, Collective Bargaining on the Campus: Professors, Associations, and Unions, 21 LABOR L.J. 167 (1970); Ferguson, Collective Bargainingin Universities and Colleges, 19 LABOR L.J. 778 (1968).
131 See Sibler, Paying the Bill for College: The "Private" Sector and the Public
Interest, ATLANTIC, May 1975, at 33.
32 Job opportunities are likely to decrease because many institutions will be forced
to close due to a decline in enrollment and a lack of funds:
Some schools, through imaginative management and good fortune, may be
able to survive the coming situation while complaining of nothing more
serious than "underutilization of facilities." But a great many independent
colleges and universities will be forced to close their doors. Small colleges are
doing so-forty-eight since 1970. ...
The higher-educational resources of the United States have been lessened by such closures, and these are but the start. ...
Id. at 39. The situation is so serious that Mr. Sibler projects that by 1995 the decrease
in students means that the equivalent of "200 universities of 5000 students each or 500
colleges of 2000 students each" will be forced to close. Id. at 38. See note 48 supra.
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longer and longer probationary periods'33 or by dismissing teachers a few months before they complete the requisite probationary
34
period to attain tenure.
If teachers cannot obtain effective protection of their academic freedom through either contractual or statutory tenure,
they will increasingly be forced to rely on the due process clause
of the Constitution. The "minimal" procedural protections of the
due process clause, however, will have to be expanded if the commitment made in Keyishian v. Board of Regents'3 5 to safeguard
academic freedom is to remain meaningful. What the due process
clause should prevent is not dismissals per se, for in some cases
staff reduction may be necessary for the survival of the school;
rather, the due process clause must prevent a school administration from having unbridled discretion in decisions to dismiss
under the guise of financial exigency. Such discretion will serve
only to threaten the job security of those who teach and think in
an unconventional manner and will "cast a pall of orthodoxy over
the classroom.' 3 To limit this discretion, the faculty must have
a voice in deciding whether a financial crisis truly faces the university and, if it does, which faculty members should be dismissed and upon what basis the decision should be made. This
limitation upon the discretion of school administrators should be
required as a matter of due process of the law.
Charles P. Leder
"
See Excessive Probation:Academic Freedom and Tenure: The Polytechnic Institute of New York, A Report on a Case of Excessive Probation, 60 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 416
(1974).
' See LaBorde v. Franklin Parish School Bd., 510 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1975). In
LaBorde the plaintiff had completed the 3-year probation period required under LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:442 (Supp. 1975) and was told by her principal that she would probably be granted tenure, but she eventually did not acquire tenure. She alleged that the
denial of tenure deprived her of a liberty interest under Roth and Sindermann and a de
facto tenure under Sindermann, but the court disagreed. Instead, it held that she acquired no expectancy of employment despite the completion of the parole period and the
advice of her principal.
M' 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See cases cited note 2 supra.
I" Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). See generally R. PIRSIG,
ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE 214 (1974) where the author suggests that
one of the greatest threats to academic freedom is a stifling conformity that more conventional minds seek to impose upon their colleagues.

